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Honoring Margaret Berger 
with a Sensible Idea 
INSISTING THAT JUDGES EMPLOY A BALANCING 
TEST BEFORE ADMITTING THE ACCUSED’S 
CONVICTIONS UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF 
EVIDENCE 609(a)(2) 
Aviva Orenstein† 
INTRODUCTION 
Impeachment of witnesses, though potentially edifying 
for the jury,1 can create a host of problems that undermine the 
fairness or accuracy of a trial. Certainly, the finder-of-fact 
(judge or jury) must be made aware of potential deficits in a 
witness’s credibility. The witness with poor eyesight who 
reports what she saw, the witness who has made a deal with 
the prosecutor, the witness with a reputation as a liar – all 
need to be impeached to reveal possible problems with their 
testimony. If the impeachment causes the jury to distrust the 
witness more than warranted, however, or, worse, to dislike the 
witness, valuable information may be inappropriately 
discounted. This problem is most acute when the witness in 
  
 † Professor of Law, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. I want to 
express my deep regard for Margaret Berger as a generous colleague, wonderful 
teacher, and role model. I would like to thank Robin Ballard, Joshua Fix, Martha 
Marion, and Judy Reckelhoff for excellent research help. Thanks also to Seth Lahn, 
Hannah Buxbaum, Leandra Lederman, Sylvia Orenstein, William Popkin, Michael 
Risinger, Ted Sampsell-Jones, Eileen Scallen, and David Szonyi for their insights, even 
though and especially because they do not all agree with my conclusions. All mistakes 
are my own. 
 1 I focus on jurors because they tend not to be repeat players in the justice 
system and hence will have more difficulty with counterintuitive evidence principles. 
Jurors are more susceptible to certain types of visceral reactions and unfair prejudice 
than trained and experienced lawyers and judges, which is not to say that concerns 
about bias and irrationality are limited to juries alone. Finally, because judges have to 
rule on the admissibility of the evidence, the practical effect of exclusion (asking them 
to forget inadmissible evidence) is more questionable than in the case of jurors who are 
deprived of the evidence entirely. 
1292 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:4 
question is also the accused in a criminal case. Impeachment 
that causes the jury to think of the accused as a bad person or 
someone who should still be in jail for prior crimes undermines 
the basic fairness of the trial. 
This essay addresses a controversial form of 
impeachment: the use of prior convictions to impeach a 
witness’s character for truthfulness. It focuses on issues raised 
when the witness is the accused because in that instance, the 
rule is most interesting and its consequences most troubling.2 
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a), which was amended in 
2006, any witness in a criminal or civil case may be impeached 
by her criminal convictions.3 Rule 609 divides the type of prior 
crimes with which a witness may be impeached into two 
categories: (1) felonies, and (2) any crimes involving dishonesty 
or false statement.4 Rule 609(a)(1) clearly provides a special 
  
 2 The “risk of unfair prejudice to a party in the use of [convictions] to 
impeach the ordinary witness is so minimal as scarcely to be a subject of comment.” 
Proposed FED. R. EVID. 609 advisory committee’s note, 51 F.R.D. 315, 392 (1971).  
 3 FED. R. EVID. 609(a). 
 4 The following is the text of Rule 609 reflecting the 2006 amendments. 
Crossed out material represents deletions; underlined material represents new 
language. 
609. Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of Crime 
(a) General rule. 
For the purpose of attacking the credibility character for truthfulness of a 
witness, 
(1) evidence that a witness other than an accused has been convicted of a 
crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by 
death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which the 
witness was convicted, and evidence that an accused has been convicted of 
such a crime shall be admitted if the court determines that the probative 
value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the 
accused; and (2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall 
be admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the 
punishment, if it readily can be determined that establishing the elements of 
the crime required proof or admission of an act of dishonesty or false 
statement by the witness. 
FED. R. EVID. 609(a). 
  Aspects of Rule 609(a) reflect major changes in the legal landscape over the 
past three centuries. Until the late nineteenth century, people accused of crimes were 
not permitted to testify at all under the party-witness rule. Our rule against self-
incriminating is actually half of a larger rule that the accused in a criminal matter was 
not allowed to testify either to incriminate or exculpate herself. Any rule for 
impeaching witnesses, therefore, did not apply to the accused, who was barred from 
taking the witness stand. 
  In a similar vein, historically, felons did not present impeachment 
conundrums; under the old English law, felonies were punishable by death, so all but 
those receiving pardons were unavailable to testify. Once some felonies became non-
capital cases, the law had to decide what to do with convicted felons on the witness 
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balancing test that the judge must apply before admitting 
felonies to impeach a witness, with more stringent screening if 
the witness is the accused. This essay proposes that, even for 
convictions that involve dishonesty and false statement, the 
judge must screen for unfair prejudice before allowing such 
prior crimes to impeach the accused. In making this argument, 
this essay stakes a position that opposes the current 
interpretation of Rule 609 by federal courts, most state courts, 
and academia. It presents not merely a policy critique of Rule 
609(a)(2), which many might agree with, but advocates that 
trial courts adopt a new interpretation and more limited 
application of this rule. In addition, perhaps this essay will 
persuade state legislatures to incorporate an explicit balancing 
test into state versions of their Rules of Evidence. 
I. IMPEACHMENT OF THE ACCUSED WITH A PRIOR FELONY 
CONVICTION 
Understanding how Rule 609 treats impeachment with 
crimes involving dishonesty or false statement requires that 
one first look at how the Rule treats felony convictions. 
Therefore, this essay first examines Rule 609(a)(1), which 
admits evidence of a felony conviction by the accused only if the 
probative value of the impeachment outweighs the prejudicial 
effect to the accused.5 Although this sounds very similar to 
Federal Rule of Evidence 403,6 which also employs language of 
probative value and prejudice, the balancing test for the 
accused imbedded in Rule 609(a) accomplishes something 
different. Rule 403 is a balancing test applied by the judge as a 
limited rule of exclusion, favoring admission of evidence; Rule 
609, by contrast, is more restrictive. Further, under Rule 
609(a)(1), the burden is on the prosecution to prove that such 
  
stand. The trend in evidence has moved from treating felons as entirely incompetent to 
testify to allowing them to testify with the impediment of disclosure of their prior 
crimes. See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 511-12 (1989) (“As the law 
evolved, th[e] absolute bar gradually was replaced by a rule that allowed such 
witnesses to testify in both civil and criminal cases, but also to be impeached by 
evidence of a prior felony conviction or a crimen falsi misdemeanor conviction.”). 
 5 FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1). 
 6 FED. R. EVID. 403 provides: “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded 
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” 
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impeachment is more probative than prejudicial to the 
accused.7  
How exactly does a prior felony conviction impeach a 
witness? Ostensibly, by hearing about a fairly recent prior 
felony, the jury learns something about the character for 
truthfulness of a witness.8 The theory is that someone who 
would flout social norms by committing felonies might also be 
more likely to lie; the same anti-social tendency that led to 
felonious conduct could lead to perjury.9 At the best of times, 
such an implication is weak.10  
At the same time, information about the accused’s 
previous felony has tremendous potential to make the trial 
unfair to the accused who takes the stand. The jurors will likely 
overvalue that information or otherwise misuse it. The mischief 
caused by evidence of the accused’s convictions transcends the 
mere imputation of criminality.  
The harm is magnified if the prior crime being used to 
impeach the testifying accused and the actual crime charged 
are similar. The jury may jump to the wrong type of propensity 
inference. Drawing an example from Rule 609(a)(1), imagine 
that someone is charged with armed robbery and takes the 
stand to deny her participation in the crime. She has a prior 
  
 7 See FED. R. EVID. 609 advisory committee’s note to 1990 amendments 
(“Although the rule does not forbid all use of convictions to impeach a defendant, it 
requires that the government show that the probative value of convictions as 
impeachment evidence outweighs their prejudicial effect.”). Also, all of Rule 609(a) 
applies only to crimes that occurred less than ten years from the “date of the conviction 
or of the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, 
whichever is the later date.” FED. R. EVID. 609(b). 
 8 Rule 609 used to refer to credibility but was changed in 2006 to refer to 
“character for truthfulness.” See FED. R. EVID. 609 advisory committee’s note to 2006 
amendments.  
 9 This theory was articulated by Oliver Wendell Holmes, who as a Justice on 
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, wrote in a civil case: 
[W]hen it is proved that a witness has been convicted of a crime, the only 
ground for disbelieving him which such proof affords is the general readiness 
to do evil which the conviction may be supposed to show. It is from that 
general disposition alone that the jury is asked to infer a readiness to lie in 
the particular case, and thence that he has lied in fact. The evidence has no 
tendency to prove that he was mistaken, but only that he has perjured 
himself, and it reaches that conclusion solely through the general proposition 
that he is of bad character and unworthy of credit.  
Gertz v. Fitchburg R.R., 137 Mass. 77, 78 (1884).  
 10 See generally Richard D. Friedman, Character Impeachment Evidence: 
Psycho-Bayesian [!?] Analysis and a Proposed Overhaul, 38 UCLA L. REV. 637 (1991) 
(arguing that impeachment for character for truthfulness or prior convictions should 
never be allowed against a criminal defendant and explaining the limited probative 
value of such impeachment where the accused is the witness). 
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felony conviction, so the appropriate, if highly attenuated, 
implication from her prior conviction is that it casts light on 
her character for truthfulness. But what if the prior felony is 
for armed robbery? Even (or especially) with a limiting 
instruction,11 the jury is likely to gravitate to an impermissible 
inference—that the accused tends to commit armed robbery. 
This latter type of propensity evidence (as opposed to character 
for truthfulness) is clearly banned by the Evidence Rules.12 It is 
hard, however, to imagine how a jury could decline the 
unspoken invitation to think of the accused as a violent 
recidivist. Even if the evidence about the crime charged were 
weak,13 the jurors may unconsciously soften the burden of proof; 
they may be less scrupulous in weighing the evidence because 
the accused deserves punishment for past wrongs. In addition, 
they may wonder why the accused is at liberty if she has in the 
past committed armed assaults, believing that the accused is 
deserving of further punishment and preventive detention.  
Given the low probative value of prior felony evidence, 
the extreme prejudice to the accused, and the fact that 
609(a)(1) includes a special balancing test whereby felony 
convictions of the accused will be admissible only if the 
probative value of the prior felony outweighs the prejudicial 
effect to the accused,14 one might suppose that such evidence is 
rarely admitted. In fact, however, admission under Rule 
609(a)(1) is a major factor in criminal trials, and troubling 
evidence exists that many accuseds do not take the stand 
primarily to avoid triggering this form of impeachment.15 In 
answering the common-sense (but devoid of the presumption of 
  
 11 See infra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 12 Rule 404(a) expressly excludes “evidence of a person’s character or trait of 
character” in order to prove “action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion.” 
FED. R. EVID. 404(a). Relatedly, Rule 404(b) provides: “Evidence of other crimes, 
wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show 
action in conformity therewith.” FED. R. EVID. 404(b). 
 13 This might very well be so where the police may have first come to suspect 
the accused because of her priors, and not because of any strong evidence linking her 
directly to the crime charged. 
 14 Witnesses other than the accused will have their felony convictions 
subjected to the more ubiquitous and permissive Rule 403 balancing test. 
 15 See John H. Blume, The Dilemma of the Criminal Defendant with a Prior 
Record—Lessons from the Wrongfully Convicted, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 477, 491 
(2008) (documenting that of the factually innocent accused in his data set who failed to 
take the witness stand, 91% had prior convictions and “[i]n almost all instances . . . 
counsel for the wrongfully convicted defendant indicated that avoiding impeachment 
was the principal reason the defendant did not take the stand”); see also Jeffery Bellin, 
Circumventing Congress: How The Federal Courts Opened The Door To Impeaching 
Criminal Defendants With Prior Convictions, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 289, 293 (2008).  
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innocence) question why an innocent accused would not take 
the witness stand in her own defense, one reason is that the 
accused is afraid of the effects of being impeached by a prior 
conviction. 
As a functional matter, courts regularly misapply Rule 
609(a)(1) by allowing prosecutors to impeach the accused with 
felonies in ways that conflict directly with the letter, spirit, and 
history of the Rule.16 In one subset of cases, however, admission-
happy courts tend to exercise caution and restraint. Courts 
tend to take seriously the factor concerning the similarity 
between the past conviction and the charged crime, and exclude 
evidence of prior felonies to the extent that they resemble the 
crime charged.17 Courts recognize that the chances of jury 
confusion and unfair prejudice are particularly egregious in 
such cases. Under the dominant interpretation of Rule 
609(a)(2), however, courts currently have no opportunity to 
consider this prejudice. The next Part presents Rule 609(a)(2) 
and sets the stage for a discussion whether impeachment for 
crimes involving dishonesty or false statement under Rule 
609(a)(2) is subject to Rule 403 balancing. 
  
 16 Recently, Jeffrey Bellin criticized the federal courts’ “routine admission of 
defendants’ prior convictions” under Rule 609(a)(1) as contravening congressional 
intent. Bellin, supra note 15, at 293. Such a framework is the intellectual descendant of 
the old, English common law tradition barring felons from testifying at all. See id. at 
296-97 nn. 21, 23-24. Bellin outlined the “decidedly pro-impeachment,” five-factor 
analytical framework that “places an almost insurmountable burden on defendants 
attempting to exclude prior convictions.” Id. at 293. 
 17 See 28 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & VICTOR J. GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURE § 6134 (1993) (“[T]he danger of prejudice is enhanced if the witness is the 
accused and the crime was similar to the crime now charged, since this increases the 
risk that the jury will draw an impermissible inference under Rule 404(a).”). See, e.g., 
United States v. Bagley, 772 F.2d 482, 488 (9th Cir. 1985) (prior conviction for bank 
robbery excluded as impeachment of accused in current bank robbery charge because 
“there is a substantial risk that all exculpatory evidence will be overwhelmed by a 
jury’s fixation on the human tendency to draw a conclusion which is impermissible in 
law: because he did it before, he must have done it again”); United States v. Joe, 07 Cr. 
734 (JFK), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55036, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2008) (excluding 
prior conviction because “the prior conviction for firearms possession is nearly identical 
to the conduct charged in Count One, [thus] the jury may infer unfairly that Defendant 
has a propensity to commit firearms offenses”); United States v. Jaramillo, No. 1:05-
CR-13, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38016, at *7-8 (D. Utah May 24, 2007) (accused’s prior 
convictions for possession of controlled substances would not be admissible because 
their probative value “would be outweighed by their prejudicial effect because the jury 
may consider them to be evidence that he committed the possession crimes charged 
rather than merely probative of his character for truthfulness”). 
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II. IMPEACHMENT FOR CRIMES INVOLVING DISHONESTY OR 
FALSE STATEMENT 
Rule 609(a)(2), last amended in 2006, provides that 
“evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall 
be admitted regardless of the punishment, if it readily can be 
determined that establishing the elements of the crime 
required proof or admission of an act of dishonesty or false 
statement by the witness.”18 Historically, these types of crimes, 
labeled by the common law as crimen falsi, were considered 
particularly probative for impeachment purposes;19 because the 
prior convictions actually have something to do with 
dishonesty, the inference that they reflect on the character for 
truthfulness of the accused seems reasonable.  
Rule 609(a)(2), however, presents some interesting 
variations: it makes no distinction between felonies and 
misdemeanors; it does not differentiate the accused from other 
witnesses; and, most importantly for this essay, it makes no 
mention of any balancing test. 
Although there is textual, historical, doctrinal, and 
policy evidence for the proposition that Rule 609(a)(2) allows 
for no balancing, this essay advocates that this orthodoxy be 
reconsidered. It presents the arguments favoring the position 
that Rule 609(a)(2) permits no balancing, and then offers 
countervailing reasons that demonstrate why balancing is not 
only permissible, but necessary. 
  
 18 FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2). 
 19 Scholars, rulemakers, and courts have disagreed about what types of 
crimes fall into this special category regarding dishonesty and false statement, with 
theft and receipt of stolen property being areas of contention. Compare United States v. 
Gunter, 551 F.3d 472, 483 (6th Cir. 2009) (appellate court refused to consider trial 
court ruling “that because theft is an offense involving dishonesty under Tennessee 
state law, the convictions could be used for impeachment purposes under Rule 
609(a)(2)” where the defendant chose not to testify in light of the trial court’s ruling 
and therefore waived his right to appeal the ruling), and U.S. Xpress Enters. v. J.B. 
Hunt Transp., 320 F.3d 809, 816-17 (8th Cir. 2003) (trial court did not abuse discretion 
in finding that receiving stolen property was a crime involving dishonesty within the 
meaning of Rule 609(a)(2)), with United States v. Glenn, 667 F.2d 1269, 1273 (9th Cir. 
1982) (“Generally, crimes of violence, theft crimes, and crimes of stealth do not involve 
‘dishonesty or false statement’ within the meaning of rule 609(a)(2).”), and United 
States v. Foster, 227 F.3d 1096, 1100 (9th Cir. 2000) (“We therefore hold that receipt of 
stolen property is not per se a crime of dishonesty for purposes of Rule 609(a)(2), and 
conclude that the district court erred in treating it as such.”). 
  The 2006 amendment was intended to “give effect to the legislative intent 
to limit the convictions that are to be automatically admitted under subdivision (a)(2)” 
to such cases where the act of falsity or dishonesty is obvious from the nature of the 
crime charged. FED. R. EVID. 609 advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendments. 
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III. TRADITIONAL ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF NO BALANCING 
A. A Plain Reading Analysis Indicates No Rule 403 
Balancing 
The text of Rule 609(a)(2) currently states that 
convictions for crimes of dishonesty or false statement by the 
witness “shall” be admitted.20 They are not “admissible,” nor is 
the word “may” used, but instead the imperative “shall” is 
employed.21  
Nowhere does the text of Rule 609(a)(2) call for any 
balancing. Given the fact that other parts of Rule 609 include 
three different balancing tests,22 it seems unlikely that 
Congress’s failure to add a balancing test to Rule 609(a)(2) was 
a mere inadvertent omission.23  
Using another cannon of construction, one could argue 
that Rule 403 is a general rule that must give way to the more 
particular Rule 609. In United States v. Kiendra, the First 
Circuit explained:  
  
 20 FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2). 
 21 “Shall” is inherently ambiguous—in that it can mean “must,” but also can 
mean “should” or “will.” For that reason, in its recent restyling of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, the word shall was excised entirely, and the proposed “restyled” Rule 
609(a)(2) substitutes the word “must” for “shall.” See ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON 
EVIDENCE RULES, AGENDA FOR COMMITTEE MEETING 136 (Oct. 23-24, 2008), available 
at http://federalevidence.com/pdf/2009/01-Jan/RestyleFRE501-706.pdf. It is fair to say 
even before the proposed amendment that courts have read Rule’s 609(a)(2)’s “shall” as 
an imperative. The switch to “must” for restyling purposes, even if it does go through, 
is not fatal to the argument of this essay. The restyling of the rules cannot introduce 
substantive changes, so if the argument that balancing is permissible and should be 
encouraged is correct under the current rule, nothing should change with the restyling. 
The template Committee Note to each of the restyled rules reads: “The language of 
Rule [ ] has been amended as part of the restyling of the [ ] Rules to make them more 
easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. 
These changes are intended to be stylistic only.” Memorandum from Robert L. Hinkle, 
Chair, Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, to Hon. Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair, Standing 
Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure 3 (May 12, 2008), available at 
http://federalevidence.com/pdf/2008/07-July/ECRpt%20May%202008-1.pdf. To qualify 
as a substantial change, a revision “changes the structure of a rule so as to alter the 
way in which courts and litigants have thought about, and argued about, questions of 
admissibility.” Id. at 2. The change to “must” confirms, however, that my proposed 
reading of Rule 609(a)(2) is unorthodox. 
 22 The three tests are: (1) the special balance for the accused in Rule 
609(a)(1); (2) Rule 403 balance for all other witnesses in Rule 609(a)(1); and (3) the 
high hurdle for admission balance under 609(b) whereby the court may admit a stale 
conviction only if the court determines, “in the interests of justice, that the probative 
value of the conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially 
outweighs its prejudicial effect.” FED. R. EVID. 609(b). 
 23 This is the expressio unius doctrine. See W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 
499 U.S. 83 (1991).  
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Rule 403 is a general provision intended to govern a wide landscape 
of evidentiary concerns; Rule 609 is a narrow provision intended to 
regulate the impeachment of witnesses who have been convicted of 
prior crimes . . . “Specific terms prevail over the general in the same 
or another statute which otherwise might be controlling.”24 
Thus, it is argued that Rule 403 was not designed to override 
the more specific Rule 609; rather it was “designed as a guide 
for the handling of situations for which no specific rules have 
been formulated.”25  
B. No Balance Is Necessary Because Crimes Under 
609(a)(2) Are Particularly Probative 
Historically, crimes involving false statement or 
dishonesty best represent the policy underlying impeachment 
for character for truthfulness.26 One might argue that balancing 
is least necessary for these types of crimes because the 
probative value of crimes involving false statement or 
dishonesty is very high.27 Unlike garden-variety felonies, which 
merely show the witness’s anti-social tendencies, convictions 
contemplated by 609(a)(2) demonstrate that the accused is 
willing to lie and deceive. Additionally, advocates of employing 
Rule 609(a)(2) without any balancing test note that the recent 
amendment further narrowed the scope of this Rule, limiting it 
to the types of convictions in which falsity and dishonesty 
would be readily apparent from the elements of the crime. 
Hence, it is argued, such cases are increasingly few and more 
tailored to the core concern of Rule 609—imputing character 
for untruthfulness. 
  
 24 United States v. Kiendra, 663 F.2d 349, 354 (1st Cir. 1981) (quoting 
Ginsberg & Sons v. Popkin, 285 U.S. 204, 208 (1932)).  
 25 Id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee’s note); see also Palm 
Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 2000); FED. R. EVID. 403 
advisory committee’s note. 
 26 In the original debates over Rule 609, the United States House of 
Representatives advocated a version of the Rule that limited such impeachment to 
convictions involving proof or admission of an act of dishonesty or false statement. See 
Diggs v. Lyons, 741 F.2d 577, 580 (3d Cir. 1984) (reviewing the legislative history of 
Rule 609) (citing 120 Cong. Rec. 2381). 
 27 Cf. Emerald Ref., Inc. v. Kandiliotis, No. 93-1442, 1994 WL 71301, at *1 
(E.D. La. Mar. 1, 1994) (“Admissibility of past crimes of dishonesty for impeachment go 
to the issue of the seriousness with which the witness takes the oath.”). 
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C. The Legislative History Indicates that the Drafters of 
Rule 609(a)(2) Never Anticipated Balancing 
Rule 609 was hotly debated in Congress. An earlier 
draft of Rule 609 included subsection 609(a)(3), which would 
have allowed the court to exclude any type of conviction if the 
probative value was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial 
effect.28 This subsection was severely criticized and apparently 
rejected.29 Another school of thought advocated no balancing 
whatsoever for any prior crimes.30 Therefore, those who believe 
there is no balancing under Rule 609(a)(2) argue that the Rule 
represents a purposeful decision not to engage in such 
balancing. 
Those who insist on applying Rule 609 without a 
balancing test point out that the Rule was “the product of 
extensive Congressional attention and considerable legislative 
compromise, clearly reflecting a decision that judges were to 
have no discretion to exclude crimen falsi.”31 After an extensive 
review of the legislative history, the Court in United States v. 
Wong concluded that Rule 609(a)(2) “unambiguously 
demonstrates that a judge has no authority to prohibit the 
government’s effort to impeach the credibility of a witness by 
questions concerning a prior crimen falsi conviction.”32 
This view is supported by the Conference Report on 
Rule 609, which explained:  
The admission of prior convictions involving dishonesty and false 
statement is not within the discretion of the Court. Such convictions 
are peculiarly probative of credibility and, under this rule, are 
always to be admitted. Thus, judicial discretion granted with respect 
  
 28 Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference 
of the United States, Revised Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States 
Courts and Magistrates, 51 F.R.D. 315, 391 (1971). Subsection (a)(3) was described as a 
particularized application of Rule 403. Id. at 393. 
 29 117 CONG. REC. 29, 894-95 (1971). When the Supreme Court officially 
promulgated the Federal Rules of Evidence and transmitted them to the Congress, 
section 609(a)(3) had disappeared. See United States v. Wong, 703 F2d. 65, 67 (3d Cir. 
1983).  
 30 See Diggs, 741 F.2d at 579 (reviewing legislative history). 
 31 Id. at 581 (quoting United States v. Kiendra, 663 F.2d 349, 355 (1st Cir. 
1981)); United States v. Wong, 703 F.2d 65 (3d Cir. 1983); United States v. Toney, 615 
F.2d 277, 278, 280 (5th Cir. 1980) (“Congress thoroughly considered the pros and cons 
of the mandatory admissibility of limited types of prior crimes evidence and 
determined that in certain cases it was to be the rule. Rule 403 simply has no 
application where impeachment is sought through a crimen falsi.”). 
 32 703 F.2d 65, 68 (3d Cir. 1983). 
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to the admissibility of other prior convictions is not applicable to 
those involving dishonest or false statement.33 
D. Courts Are Unanimous in Ruling that Rule 609(a)(2) 
Allows for No Balancing 
In Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., the Supreme 
Court observed of Rule 609(a), in dicta: “With regard to subpart 
(2), which governs impeachment by crimen falsi convictions, it 
is widely agreed that this imperative, coupled with the absence 
of any balancing language, bars exercise of judicial discretion 
pursuant to Rule 403.”34 All circuits have also come to this same 
conclusion,35 though they debate the parameters of the rule.36 
  
 33 H.R. REP. No. 1597, at 9 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7098, 7102. 
Similarly, the original advisory committee’s note explained that the “admission of prior 
convictions involving dishonesty and false statement is not within the discretion of the 
court. Such convictions are peculiarly probative of credibility and, under this rule, are 
always to be admitted.” FED. R. EVID. 609 advisory committee’s note. 
 34 490 U.S. 504, 525-26 (1989), superseded on other grounds by 1990 
amendment to FED. R. EVID. 609(a). 
 35 See, e.g., SEC v. Sargent, 229 F.3d 68, 80 (1st Cir. 2000) (“[W]e have 
plainly held that district courts do not have discretion to exclude prior convictions 
involving dishonesty or false statements.”); United States v. Estrada, 430 F.3d 606, 
615-16 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[C]rimes involving ‘dishonesty or false statement,’ whether 
felonies or misdemeanors, must be admitted under Rule 609(a)(2) as being per se 
probative of credibility.”); Walker v. Horn, 385 F.3d 321, 333 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[I]f the 
prior conviction involved dishonesty or false statements, the conviction is automatically 
admissible insofar as the district court is without discretion to weigh the prejudicial 
effect of the proffered evidence against its probative value.”) (internal citation omitted); 
United States v. Kelly, 510 F.3d 433 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied Kelly v. United States, 
552 U.S. 1329 (2008) (“A trial judge has no discretion to exclude evidence that qualifies 
under this rule (609(a)(2)).”) (internal citation omitted); United States v. Harper, 527 
F.3d 396 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Crimes qualifying for admission under Rule 609 (a)(2) are 
not subject to Rule 403 balancing and must be admitted.”); United States v. Morrow, 
977 F.2d 222, 228 (6th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (“Rule 609(a)(2) . . . clearly limits the 
discretion of the court by mandating the admission of crimes involving dishonesty or 
false statements.”); Kunz v. DeFelice, 538 F.3d 667, 675 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Rule 609(a)(2) 
. . . does not incorporate Rule 403.”); United States v. Collier, 527 F.3d 695 (8th Cir. 
2008) (“Evidence of a conviction requiring proof or admission of an act of dishonesty or 
false statement is automatically admissible and not subject to Rule 403 balancing by 
the court.”) (internal citations omitted); United States v. Harris, 738 F.2d 1068, 1073 
(9th Cir. 1984) (“[C]rimes involving dishonesty and fraud are automatically admissible 
for impeachment purposes under Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(2).”) (internal citations omitted); 
United States v. Begay, 144 F.3d 1336, 1338 (10th Cir. 1998) (“Rule 403 balancing 
applies unless the prior crime involves dishonesty or false statements.”). Although I 
could find no current case in the Eleventh Circuit, a Fifth Circuit case before the circuit 
split would seem to apply. See United States v. Williams, 642 F.2d 136, 140 (5th Cir. 
1981) (“[B]ribery is a crimen falsi in that it involves dishonesty. Hence, it is 
automatically admissible.”) (internal citation omitted).  
 36 There were certainly debates in the common law surrounding Rule 
609(a)(2), but they concerned the scope of crimen falsi. Historically, some courts 
extended Rule 609(a)(2) to crimes such as drug use or robbery, crimes in which the 
aspect of false statement or dishonesty was highly questionable. Even before the 2006 
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The treatise writers also agree.37 This unanimity was not 
always the case under the prior common law,38 and a number of 
courts considered the question open during the late 1970s.39 
Before the codification of the evidence rules, the common law, 
while favoring the use of impeachment for crimes of dishonesty 
and false statement, did not deprive judges of discretion to 
disallow such evidence.40 
E. The Fact of Recent Amendment Indicates that Judicial 
Interpretations of Rule 609(a)(2) Were Acceptable 
The Federal Rules of Evidence are an odd hybrid of 
statutes passed by Congress, and rules and amendments 
promulgated via the Rules Enabling Act process.41 In 2006, Rule 
609 was amended via the rulemaking process, and included 
important changes to Rule 609(a)(2), yet nothing was altered 
concerning the apparent absence of balancing. Given the 
unanimous judicial authority indicating no balancing for Rule 
609(a)(2), this would seem like an endorsement of those judicial 
  
amendment, the modern trend had been to limit the types of crimes admissible under 
this rule, precisely because there was perceived to be no opportunity for balancing. See, 
e.g., United States v. Foster, 227 F.3d 1096, 1100 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that receipt 
of stolen property is not per se a crime of dishonesty); cf. Cree v. Hatcher, 969 F.2d 34, 
37 (3d Cir. 1992) (“Because the district court lacks the discretion to engage in 
balancing, 609(a)(2) must be interpreted narrowly to apply to only those crimes that, in 
the words of the Conference Committee, bear on a witness’s propensity to testify 
truthfully.”). The 2006 amendment limits the types of crimes even further. Courts also 
debate the level of detail that could be presented about the conviction. United States v. 
Sine, 493 F.3d 1021, 1036 n.14 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that convictions admitted for 
impeachment may not include collateral details). Cf. Commerce Funding v. 
Comprehensive Habilitation Servs., 01 Civ. 3796, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7902, at *26-
27 (May 2, 2005) (in a civil case, admitting prior crime under 609(a)(2) but limiting the 
underlying facts using Rule 403). 
 37 See WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 17, at § 6135 (“[S]ubdivision (a)(2) neither 
requires nor permits balancing under Rule 403 or any other test.”); see also infra note 
78. 
 38 See United States v. Toney, 615 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1980) (Tuttle, J., 
dissenting); Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940-41 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (allowing 
balancing for all prior convictions of the accused). 
 39 See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 358 n.20 (D.C. Cir. 1976); 
see also Daniel R. Swetnam, Comment, The Interaction of Rules 609(a)(2) and 403 of 
the Federal Rules of Evidence: Can Evidence of A Prior Conviction which Falls within 
the Ambit of Rule 609(a)(2) be Excluded by Rule 403?, 50 U. CIN. L. REV. 380 (1981) 
(arguing that Rule 403 balancing does apply). 
 40 See, e.g., Gordon, 383 F.2d at 939-40 (setting out criteria for the admission 
of prior crimes, but applying no absolute rules concerning crimes of dishonest or false 
statement). 
 41 Congress rejected the Evidence Rules as promulgated in 1975 and instead 
codified its own version as statutes. Other amendments have been made as statutory 
additions to the Evidence Rules. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 413-415. 
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interpretations, albeit by a body different from the original 
legislature that enacted Rule 609.42 
IV. WHY THERE MUST BE SOME BALANCING IN APPLYING 
RULE 609(a)(2) 
Given the consensus among judges and academics 
supported by a plain reading of the text, dicta from the United 
States Supreme Court, and the Conference Report on Rule 609 
that Rule 609(a)(2) does not allow balancing, what is the 
justification for the contrary view? The counter-arguments 
reflect concerns for basic fairness and the structural integrity 
of the administration of evidence rules. Although subjecting 
Rule 609(a)(2) to Rule 403 balancing is not the most natural 
interpretation of the plain meaning, it is a reasonable one that 
must be preferred to guarantee due process.  
A. Without Balancing, There Is Potential for Intolerable 
Unfairness to the Accused 
Although one could aptly criticize courts’ balancing for 
felony convictions under 609(a)(1), courts do tend to follow one 
protective principle: the exclusion of prior felony convictions 
where the accused is charged with a similar crime.43 By 
contrast, under the current interpretation of Rule 609(a)(2), no 
such consideration, no matter how extreme the potential 
prejudice, is entertained. 
Where the crime charged and the prior conviction are 
the same, the prejudice is overwhelming. For instance, in 
United States v. Wilson,44 the accused was charged with 
conspiring to defraud the United States government of tax 
revenue and was impeached with his prior conviction for 
failure to file tax returns. No Rule 403 balancing test was 
  
 42 Cf. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 156 (2000) 
(“Congress’ tobacco-specific legislation has effectively ratified the FDA’s previous 
position that it lacks jurisdiction to regulate tobacco.”). 
 43 See supra note 17 and accompanying text; see also 4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & 
MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 609.05[3][d] (Joseph M. 
McLaughlin ed., Matthew Bender 2d ed. 1997) (“When a prior crime committed by the 
accused is similar to the one with which the accused is charged, the prejudicial effect of 
a prior conviction admitted for impeachment may well outweigh its probative value. 
Consequently, prior convictions for the same or similar crimes are admitted 
sparingly.”). 
 44 985 F.2d 348, 350-51 (7th Cir. 1993). 
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allowed or conducted.45 The permitted chain of inference, that 
since the accused evaded taxes before, he is probably a liar who 
is not telling the truth about evading taxes now, is 
preposterously obscure and ultimately toxic. Realistically, such 
impeachment invited the jury to think of the accused as a 
recidivistic tax dodger.46 Other cases, such as a bank fraud case 
where the accused’s prior conviction for bank larceny was 
admitted,47 mail fraud where the accused’s prior mail fraud was 
admitted,48 and counterfeiting where the accused’s prior 
conviction for counterfeiting was admitted,49 similarly fit this 
template. In none of these, however, did the court apply a Rule 
403 balancing test. 
The potential for extreme unfairness stems from two 
factors: (1) the effect on the jury; and (2) the consequent 
strategic decision, which many of the accuseds will make, not 
to testify at all. The presumption of innocence is a hard 
principle to effectuate even under the best of circumstances. 
The jurors already will have a tough time remembering that 
the person sitting at the defense table, whom the police have 
arrested and the government is prosecuting, must be presumed 
innocent until proven otherwise. This presumption becomes 
much more difficult when the jurors learn that the accused has 
a criminal past and, in fact, a record for doing the exact same 
thing. The jurors will label the accused as a criminal with a 
specialty crime, and not limit their skepticism to just the 
question of the accused’s character for truthfulness.50  
  
 45 Id. at 351 (citations omitted). 
 46 This is also the fact pattern in United States v. Tanaka, 204 Fed. Appx. 
705, 706 (9th Cir. 2006). The accused was charged with convictions for structuring 
transactions to evade currency reporting requirements and willful failure to file a tax 
return. The court admitted his prior tax conviction under Rule 609(a)(2). The court 
explained: “Failure to file a tax return is a crime involving dishonesty or false 
statement, and crimes involving dishonesty are automatically admissible for 
impeachment purposes under Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(2), and no balancing of 
prejudice is required.” Id. 
 47 United States v. Carroll, 663 F. Supp. 210, 211-12, 214 (D. Md. 1986). 
 48 United States v. Kuecker, 740 F.2d 496, 498, 502 (7th Cir. 1984); United 
States v. Toney, 615 F.2d 277, 278, 280 (5th Cir. 1980) (“Congress meant what it said 
in rule 609(a)(2) that the fact of a prior conviction for an offense such as mail fraud is 
always admissible for impeachment purposes.”). 
 49 United States v. Noble, 754 F.2d 1324, 1326 (7th Cir. 1985); United States 
v. Smith, 181 F. Supp. 2d 904, 909 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (forgery conviction admitted in 
counterfeiting case). 
 50 Limiting instructions will not solve the problem. A limiting instruction 
would theoretically focus the jury on the appropriate inference of character for 
truthfulness. The following is typical: “Th[e] [defendant’s] earlier conviction was 
brought to your attention only as one way of helping you decide how believable his 
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Furthermore, the jury may soften the standard of proof. 
Once jurors hear that the accused has been convicted of forgery, 
mail fraud, or tax evasion in the past, the jurors’ concern about 
making a mistake declines significantly. Even if the accused did 
not commit the crime this time, it is not as if she is without 
blame for some similar activity in the past, so an erroneous 
conviction would not be a tragedy of an innocent person falsely 
convicted. Finally, if the prior conviction reflects conduct more 
heinous than the charged crime, the jury could be distracted or 
seek to punish the accused further. 
This line of thinking is thoroughly predictable; 
therefore, the accused must consider the nature of the 
impeachment she will experience if she takes the stand in her 
own defense. If the judge has no power to exclude the accused’s 
prior crime involving dishonesty or false statement, no matter 
how prejudicial, the accused may simply decline to exercise her 
right to testify and avoid impeachment altogether. Thus, the 
accused is presented with an impossible dilemma. If she 
testifies, the jury will form negative assessments of her 
criminality generally and her propensity to commit certain 
crimes. On the other hand, failure to take the stand also 
presents a huge, unfair burden on the accused because jurors 
tend to believe that criminal defendants who do not testify are 
more likely to be guilty.51 
  
testimony was. You cannot use it for any other purpose. It is not evidence that he is 
guilty of the crime that he is on trial for now.” O’MALLEY, GRENIG & LEE, 1A FEDERAL 
JURY PRACTICE & INSTRUCTIONS § 15.08 (5th ed. 2007) (listing this instruction from 
Sixth Circuit and providing other examples by Circuit) (cited in Bellin, supra note 15, 
at 300 n.37). Scholars have long noted the ineffectiveness of limiting instructions; in 
fact, such instructions tend to draw attention to the evidence and may inadvertently 
increase the unfairness of its use. Joel Lieberman, Understanding the Limits of 
Limiting Instructions: Social Psychological Explanations for the Failures to 
Instructions to Disregard Pretrial Publicity and Other Inadmissible Evidence, 6 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y. & L., 677, 677-86, (2000) (empirical research has demonstrated 
that judicial admonitions to ignore evidence are relatively ineffective and sometimes 
produce a backfire effect, resulting in jurors being more likely to rely on inadmissible 
information after they have been specifically instructed to disregard it); J. Alexander 
Tanford, Thinking About Elephants: Admonitions, Empirical Research and Legal 
Policy, 60 UMKC L. REV. 645, 651 (1992) (discussing the psychological futility of 
limiting instructions).  
 51 See David Shaffer & Thomas Case, On the Decision to Testify in One’s Own 
Behalf: Effects of Withheld Evidence, Defendant’s Sexual Preferences, and Juror 
Dogmatism on Juridic Decisions, 42 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 335 (1982) 
(indicating that defendants who invoked the Fifth Amendment (either on the stand or 
by declining to take the stand) were judged more likely to be guilty and more deserving 
of conviction than their counterparts who took the stand and answered all questions. 
“It appears as if many of our subject-jurors chose to disregard that judge’s instructions 
and act on an impression that an innocent person who had nothing to hide would 
surely not resort to such legal chicanery as a Fifth Amendment plea.”). 
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Although the accused often faces the dilemma of 
whether to testify and be impeached with a former crime or to 
forgo the opportunity to testify altogether, that decision, when 
it involves felonies under 609(a)(1), is made in light of a judge’s 
belief that the prior conviction was more probative than 
prejudicial. Without introducing Rule 403 as a judicial 
screening device, prior crimes that are highly prejudicial would 
be admitted with no such check. This is a loss not only for the 
accused, but also for the whole justice system because the 
criminal defendant likely has valuable information that will 
increase trial accuracy.52 
B. The Probative Value of Any Prior Conviction Is 
Diminished in the Case of the Accused 
Assuming, arguendo, that prior convictions for 
dishonesty or false statement are generally probative of a 
witness’s character for truthfulness, the probative value of such 
impeachment declines significantly when the witness is the 
accused.53 Jurors are probably already skeptical of the 
testimony of a defendant who claims that she did not commit 
the charged crime. It is natural to suppose that the accused 
might lie about her conduct to avoid punishment.54 Therefore, 
the added information that the accused actually has committed 
a prior crime of dishonesty or false statement adds significant 
  
 52 See Ted Sampsell-Jones, Making Defendants Speak, 93 MINN. L. REV. 
1327, 1328-29 (2009) (proposing changes in evidence law to encourage the accused to 
take the witness stand). 
 53 Theoretically, it is possible to believe an accused’s denials slightly less 
when one hears that the accused who denied moving survey markers on federal land 
committed perjury in the past, United States v. Caudle, 48 F.3d 433, 435 (9th Cir. 
1995), or the accused who is on trial for bank fraud was convicted of tampering with an 
odometer. United States v. Harris, 512 F. Supp. 1174, 1175-78 (D. Conn. 1981). 
 54 See Friedman, supra note 10 at 638, 659 (arguing that prior bad acts of the 
accused are “almost certain to yield no significant new information about his 
truthtelling inclination in the specific case” because “a rational jury usually will 
conclude, even without character impeachment, that the accused has a strong interest 
in lying and little compunction against doing so. Character impeachment evidence is 
overkill”); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Prior Crime Impeachment of Criminal Defendants: A 
Constitutional Analysis of Rule 609, 82 W. VA. L. REV. 391, 408 (1980) (“Greater 
incentive to deceive can hardly be imagined [than a defendant’s interest in acquittal] 
and this motive and propensity are well understood and recognized by each member of 
the jury.”) (quoted in Jeffrey Bellin, Circumventing Congress: How the Federal Courts 
Opened the Door to Impeaching Criminal Defendants with Prior Convictions, 42 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 289, 289 n.32 (2008)); Sampsell-Jones, Making Defendants Speak, supra 
note 52, at 1367 (“[I]n every criminal case, a defendant’s interest in the outcome is 
obvious, therefore lessening the need for other impeachment evidence.”) (citing 1 
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 39, at 173 (Kenneth S. Brown ed., 6th ed. 2006)). 
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prejudice without adding any additional probative value or 
promoting a more informed verdict.55 
C. From a Linguistic Perspective, Rule 609(a)(2) Could Be 
Read as Subject to Rule 403 
Although Rule 609(a)(2) says that crimes of falsity and 
dishonesty “shall be admitted,” it is nevertheless still possible 
to read that form of impeachment as being subject to the 
pervasive balance of Rule 403. Even with the transition to 
“must” in the restyled rules,56 one could argue that it must be 
admitted subject to Rule 403. To read Rule 609(a)(2) as outside 
the reach of Rule 403 would mean that it is an evidence rule in 
a category all its own, the only one entirely insulated from 
judicial intervention on basic fairness grounds. Given that 
unusual status, the presumption should be that all rules are 
subject to Rule 403 unless the balance is affirmatively rejected 
or another balance is proposed in its place. “Although one must 
be somewhat of an interpretative funambulist to walk between 
the conflicting demands of these Rules in order to arrive at a 
resolution,”57 this is a credible, if strained reading that will 
effectuate vital evidence policy and address the due process 
concerns raised below.58  
  
 55 Some states that otherwise have adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence as 
their own deviate from the template of Rule 609. Examples include: Arizona, ARIZ. R. 
EVID. 609(a) (which applies the same test to felonies and crimes involving dishonesty or 
false statement); Tennessee, TENN. R. EVID. 609(a)(3) (“If the witness to be impeached 
is the accused in a criminal prosecution . . . the court upon request must determine 
that the conviction’s probative value on credibility outweighs its unfair prejudicial 
effect on the substantive issues.”); and Hawaii, HAW. R. EVID. 609(a) (limiting all 
impeachment to convictions involving dishonesty and false statements, but only 
allowing such impeachment against the accused when the accused has first presented 
evidence supporting her credibility). Montana allows no impeachment by conviction at 
all. MONT. R. EVID. 609. 
 56 See supra note 21. 
 57 Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 194 (1987) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting). 
 58 The Supreme Court of Iowa has taken this policy a step further, and 
requires more stringent 609(a)(1) balancing of 609(a)(2) convictions, despite the fact 
that Iowa’s rules of evidence read identically to the pre-2006 federal rules for the 
purposes of Rule 609(a). See State v. Axiotis, 569 N.W.2d 813, 815 (Iowa 1997) (“Iowa 
rule of evidence 609, subsection 609(a)(2) provides concerning impeachment that 
‘evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if it involved 
dishonesty or false statement . . . .’ The trial court also must determine ‘that the 
probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the 
accused.’”). 
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D. There is Precedent in the Evidence Rules for 
Acknowledging the Potential Due Process Problems with 
Similar Act Character Evidence of the Accused and for 
Applying Rule 403 Despite the Absolutist Language  
A more recent debate about the applicability of Rule 403 
to another set of Evidence Rules offers insight into how Rule 
609(a)(2) should be interpreted. Federal Rules of Evidence 413-
414, enacted by statute in 1995, have been subject to Rule 403 
balancing even though Rule 403 is not mentioned in those 
Rules. The language of Rule 413 commands that “[i]n a 
criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an offense of 
sexual assault, evidence of the defendant’s commission of 
another offense or offenses of sexual assault is admissible, and 
may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is 
relevant.”59 Arguably, the language “is admissible” represents 
an unmodified command to admit the evidence, prohibiting 
judges from exercising their discretion to balance between 
probative value and unfair prejudice. However, every court 
that has considered the question has held that Rule 403 
applies.60  
Admittedly, Rules 413-414 do not present a perfect 
analogy. The phrase “is admissible” is less absolute than the 
command of Rule 609(a)(2) “shall be admitted.”61 At least part 
of the legislative history of Rules 413-414 anticipated the use of 
Rule 403 balancing, even though Rule 403 itself is not 
mentioned in the text of Rules 413-414.62 And, no variation of 
  
 59 FED. R. EVID. 413. The language of Rule 414 is identical, except that Rule 
413 is for sex; Rule 414 is for child molestation. FED. R. EVID. 414. The restyled rules, 
perhaps in light of the jurisprudence surrounding Rules 413-414 read: the court may 
admit evidence that the defendant committed any other sexual assault. 
 60 See Aviva Orenstein, Deviance, Due Process, and the False Promise of 
Federal Rule of Evidence 403, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1487, 1517-19 (2005) (noting the 
courts’ holdings that Rule 403 applies but expressing concern that courts do no apply 
the balancing test in a meaningful fashion, but instead engage in Rule “403-lite”). 
 61 See United States v. Sumner, 119 F.3d 658, 661-62 (8th Cir. 1997). 
 62 Then representative Kyl explicitly noted that “[t]he trial court retains the 
total discretion to include or exclude this type of evidence.” 140 CONG. REC. H5437-03, 
H5438 (daily ed. June 29, 1994) (statement of Rep. Kyl) (quoted in United States v. 
Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1431 (10th Cir. 1998)); see also United States v. Sumner, 119 
F.3d 658, 662 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting a statement by Rep. Molinari: “In other respects, 
the general standards of the rules of evidence will continue to apply, including . . . the 
court’s authority under Evidence Rule 403 to exclude evidence whose probative value is 
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.” Floor Statement of the Principal 
House Sponsor, Representative Susan Molinari, Concerning the Prior Crimes Rules for 
Sexual Assault and Child Molestation Cases, 103 CONG. REC. H8991-92 (daily ed. Aug. 
21, 1994)). Others were not so sure. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORTS 
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Rule 403 appears in other sections of Rules 413-414, as occurs 
with Rule 609. Nevertheless, courts unanimously read Rule 
403 into the text of Rules where it seemingly does not apply, 
and do so for reasons of basic fairness. As the Tenth Circuit 
explained in United States v. Enjady,63 the adoption of Rules 
413-414 “without any exclusion of or amendment to Rule 403 
makes Rule 403 applicable, as it is to others of the rules of 
evidence.”64 There is no exclusion of Rule 403 in the text of Rule 
609(a)(2), and the principle applies equally to it. 
The courts that wrestled with Rules 413-414 made clear 
that their application of Rule 403 was rooted in due process 
considerations. Criminal defendants opposing the new rules 
argued persuasively that the highly prejudicial evidence of 
prior sex crimes violated fundamental fairness. The courts 
acknowledged a serious problem, but noted that the Supreme 
Court had left open whether violations of historical character 
evidence protections constituted a due process violation, and 
were not necessarily convinced that the unfairness fell within 
the limited category of infractions that violate fundamental 
fairness. However, even the courts that acknowledged a due 
process problem were satisfied that the discretionary power of 
the judge under Rule 403 addressed any due process concerns. 
These cases clarified that Rule 403 served as a guarantor of 
due process.65  
The potential prejudice in 609(a)(2) cases where the 
prior conviction is similar to the crime charged is equally 
extreme and undermines the basic fairness of the trial. The 
remedy, application of Rule 403, should be the same. 
E. Respect for the District Court’s Function Mandates that 
Judges Retain the Authority to Engage in Some 
Balancing, Even Regarding Convictions Involving 
Dishonesty or Falsehood 
Oftentimes, a conviction for falsity or dishonesty will 
seem probative, maybe even highly probative, of the accused’s 
  
OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ON ADMISSION OF CHARACTER EVIDENCE IN CERTAIN 
SEXUAL MISCONDUCT CASES (1995), reprinted in 56 CRIM. L. REP 2139 (recommending 
rejecting of the rules in part because applicability of Rule 403 was uncertain). 
 63 134 F.3d 1427 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 64 Id. at 143 (citations omitted). 
 65 See, e.g., United States v. Catstillo, 140 F.3d 874, 883 (10th Cir. 1998) 
(“[A]pplication of Rule 403 to Rule 414 evidence eliminates the due process concerns 
posed by Rule 414.”); see generally supra note 60, at 1517-18. 
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credibility; but that does not mean the consideration is over. 
The trial court must have the discretion to examine the other 
side of the Rule 403 balance—the nature and extent of unfair 
prejudice. Traditionally, the district court judge serves a vital 
role as evidence screener. The trial court is in the best position 
to make the context and fact-driven determination of how 
probative versus how prejudicial the prior conviction will be. As 
argued above, requiring the admission of prior convictions and 
disallowing any judicial oversight is unfair to the accused. In 
addition, it strips the trial court of a major judicial function. 
This concern with the judge’s role was the basis of 
Judge Tuttle’s dissent in United States v. Toney,66 which 
explained that, “the purpose of rule 403 was to provide judges 
some flexibility in cases where the possibility of prejudice is 
extremely great.”67 In analyzing the facts of the case Judge 
Tuttle observed:  
It would be hard to imagine evidence more prejudicial, in a trial for 
mail fraud, then [sic] the defendant’s prior conviction for mail fraud. 
I would suggest that the probative value of a conviction involving 
dishonesty is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice to the defendant, when the prior conviction concerns the 
same kind of offense as that for which the defendant is being tried.68 
He therefore concluded that “[a] judge should not be prohibited 
from excluding this evidence by a rigid holding that rule 403 
can never be applied to rule 609(a)(2).”69 
Allowing a Rule 403 balance reflects the natural 
function of the trial judge who will probably be holding various 
hearings to rule on evidence anyway. It requires no special 
extra administrative energy, but reinforces the quintessential 
role of the judge as screener and gatekeeper. As the Supreme 
Court explained in United States v. Abel,70 “[a] district court is 
accorded a wide discretion in determining the admissibility of 
evidence under the Federal Rules. Assessing the probative 
value of [the proffered evidence], and weighing any factors 
counseling against admissibility is a matter first for the district 
court’s sound judgment under Rules 401 and 403. . . .”71 That 
discretion is central to and inherent in the judicial role, and it 
  
 66 615 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1980) (Tuttle, J., dissenting). 
 67 Id. at 283. 
 68 Id. at 283-84. 
 69 Id. 
 70 469 U.S. 45 (1984). 
 71 Id. at 54. 
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appears in many aspects of the judge’s labors.72 The judicial 
duty to secure a fair trial devoid of substantial and 
unnecessary unfair prejudice can be fulfilled with a creative 
reading of Rule 609(a)(2).  
V. JUDICIAL CONTROL OF THE EXTENT OF IMPEACHMENT 
UNDER RULE 609(a)(2) 
For reasons of fairness, respect for the structure of the 
rules, and the power of the judge, Rule 403 balancing must 
apply to Rule 609(a)(2). If this argument buckles under the 
weight of the authority opposed to it, however, the very least 
trial judges can do is limit the way the impeachment is proved. 
If, indeed, a judge must allow the prosecutor to impeach an 
accused charged with a prior conviction for wire fraud, then 
perhaps the damage can be limited by prohibiting the 
admission of the specific nature of the prior crime. The jury 
could be informed that the accused had been convicted of a 
crime involving dishonesty, but not exactly what that crime 
was.  Some states have done just that, allowing the fact of a 
prior conviction, but not the details of the prior crime.73  
  
 72 There is a long tradition of the judge as gatekeeper. Judges perform that 
role in screening expert testimony. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 148 
(1997) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[N]either the difficulty of the task nor any comparative 
lack of expertise can excuse the judge from exercising the ‘gatekeeper’ duties that the 
Federal Rules . . . impose—determining, for example, whether particular expert 
testimony is reliable and ‘will assist the trier of fact,’ Fed. Rule Evid. 702, or whether 
the ‘probative value’ of testimony is substantially outweighed by risks of prejudice, 
confusion or waste of time, Fed. Rule Evid. 403.”). Even where the rules of evidence do 
not apply, the judge retains a gatekeeper role. Judges act as gatekeepers under the 
Federal Death Penalty Act. See United States v. Pepin, 514 F.3d 193, 204 (2d Cir. 
2008) (“[U]nder the FDPA [s]tandard, judges continue their role as evidentiary 
gatekeepers and, pursuant to the balancing test set forth in § 3593(c), retain the 
discretion to exclude any type of unreliable or prejudicial evidence that might render a 
trial fundamentally unfair.”); United States v. Roman, 371 F. Supp. 2d 36, 43 (D.P.R. 
2005) (“Although capital sentencing proceedings are released from the strictures of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, see 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c), the trial judge retains his 
traditional role as gatekeeper of constitutionally permissible information, and must 
accordingly exclude any unreliable or prejudicial information that might render a trial 
fundamentally unfair.”).  
 73 See State v. Geyer, 194 Conn. 1, 16 (1984) (“The defendant’s character, 
from which the jury might draw an inference of dishonesty, would thus be sufficiently 
impugned without the extraordinary prejudice that sometimes follows when the prior 
crime is specifically named.”); State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227, 230 (1971) (requiring 
balancing by the judge to admit the specific nature of the prior conviction); cf. State v. 
Brunson, 132 N.J. 377, 391 (1993) (limiting evidence of conviction to “the degree of the 
crime and the date of the offense but excluding any evidence of the specific crime of 
which defendant was convicted”); State v. White, 43 Wash. App. 580, 586 (Ct. App. 
1986) (citing State v. Jones, 101 Wash. 2d 113, 121 (1984)) (placing the decision 
whether to allow specifics about the prior crime in the hands of the district court). But 
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From where would the judge, bound by the current text 
of 609(a)(2), derive authority to follow these state courts’ lead? 
If the answer is Rule 403,74 we would seemingly be right back 
where we started, and this proposal could not serve as a next-
best method to avoid the intolerable unfairness of impeaching 
the accused with evidence of a similar prior crime. However, it 
cannot be true that no part of Rule 403 applies to admission of 
impeachment for a prior crime of dishonesty. Certainly, the 
prosecutor cannot, in the course of proving a prior conviction 
involving dishonesty or false statement, make outrageous 
comments about “bloodsucking hucksters who prey on the 
elderly” or call weepy victims to prove the prior fraud. Such 
tactics would be prohibited even if the specific nature of the 
crime is admissible. Hence, some residual power vested in the 
court under Rule 403 and Rule 611,75 which controls the order 
and mode of proof, support the inherent ability of the trial 
court judge to manage the evidence. Limiting the prior 
conviction for an act of dishonesty to the fact of such conviction, 
without naming or describing the exact crime, would mitigate 
the immense prejudice against the accused. In addition, this 
  
see People v. Van Dorsten, 298 N.W.2d 421, 421 (Mich. 1980) (“It is improper to 
impeach defendant by telling jury only of existence of unnamed prior felony 
convictions, without providing names of the offenses, since it is the nature, rather than 
the fact, of prior felony conviction which jury is to use in its evaluation of credibility.”). 
 74 State v. White, 43 Wash. App. 580, 586 (Ct. App. 1986) (citing State v. 
Jones, 101 Wash. 2d 113, 121 (1984)) (“[T]he determination of whether to name or not 
name the prior convictions introduced for the purposes of impeachment should rest 
with the discretion of the trial judge as an additional aspect of the ultimate 
determination that the prejudicial effect of the evidence on the defendant does not 
outweigh its probative value.”). 
 75 Rule 611, entitled “Mode and Order of Interrogation and Presentation” in 
section (a) provides: “The court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and 
order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the 
interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid 
needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue 
embarrassment.” The advisory committee note explains: 
[Rule 611] restates in broad terms the power and obligation of the judge as 
developed under common law principles. It covers such concerns as whether 
testimony shall be in the form of a free narrative or responses to specific 
questions, the order of calling witnesses and presenting evidence, the use of 
demonstrative evidence, and the many other questions arising during the 
course of a trial which can be solved only by the judge’s common sense and 
fairness in view of the particular circumstances. 
FED. R. EVID. 611 advisory committee’s note (citations omitted). 
  Cf. 4 WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 43, § 611.03[4](A), at 
611-42.2 (explaining that under Rule 611, a district court balances “the factors of 
prejudice, confusion, and delay against the probative value of the testimony” in 
deciding whether to limit cross examination). 
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proposed limitation fits the pattern of Old Chief v. United 
States,76 where the Court held that in a prosecution for being a 
felon in possession of a gun, a prosecutor was not entitled to 
admit details of a prior felony if the accused would stipulate to 
his status as a felon. Although Old Chief arose in the context of 
proving a status, it is similar in posture to the Rule 609(a)(2) 
scenario where the proof of a fact is collateral to the underlying 
accusation and presents the danger of inviting the jury to make 
an impermissible propensity inference. Old Chief can operate 
by analogy only because, of course, it was a Rule 403 case. 
Nevertheless, its focus on the process of proving an admissible 
fact for a collateral purpose is instructive. 
CONCLUSION 
My sensible proposal is that all evidence must be 
screened for unfair prejudice, and where the unfair prejudice 
substantially outweighs the probative value of such evidence, 
the trial court must, out of fairness for the accused and respect 
for the trial court, possess the discretion to disallow it. This 
principle applies even to impeachment under Rule 609(a)(2) for 
felonies of dishonesty and false statement. I do not propose any 
special, more favorable tests for the accused (as appears in 
Rule 609(a)(1)), but argue that a basic Rule 403 balance, which 
tends to admit all but the most unfairly prejudicial evidence, is 
absolutely fundamental to due process. Indeed, in other 
contexts, it has been heralded as the guarantor of due process. 
Although courts will doubtlessly conclude that most convictions 
regarding dishonesty and false statement are highly probative 
and do pass the balancing test of Rule 403,77 there are clearly 
some cases where such a test cannot be passed, especially 
where the accused is the witness. In such cases, the fairness of 
the trial is put in question without a Rule 403 balance.  
Given that there is currently no balancing, and hence no 
point in making a motion in limine to exclude evidence of 
convictions for dishonesty or false statement, it is impossible to 
know how many of the accused forgo their right to take the 
stand in their own defense. This discouragement from taking 
the stand is seriously troubling because the accused could 
  
 76 529 U.S. 172, 201 (1997). 
 77 See United States v. Toney, 615 F.2d 277, 283 (5th Cir. 1980) (Tuttle, J., 
dissenting) (“[C]onvictions involving dishonesty could be excluded only upon a strong 
showing of overwhelming prejudice to the defendant.”). 
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present useful information and juries tend to be more 
conviction-prone if the accused does not testify. 
Finally, why did I choose this sensible idea to honor 
Margaret Berger? Professor Berger is justly famous for her 
work on scientific evidence and expert testimony, but has not 
written extensively on character evidence. However, in her 
immensely important treatise and her various Science for 
Judges articles Professor Berger, undoubtedly influenced by 
the model of her teacher and collaborator, Judge Jack 
Weinstein, evinces faith in the trial judge and the importance 
of the judicial “gatekeeper” role. The tenor of Professor Berger’s 
remarkable career reflects a genuine trust in the capacity and 
good sense of trial judges, and she has invested her time and 
talent into educating them. Where judges are wrong-headed, 
Professor Berger has never shied away from challenging 
mistaken rulings. In her writings on evidentiary error, the 
confrontation clause, and expert testimony, Professor Berger 
also has championed the rights of the accused. Even though I 
am challenging a statement in her own treatise,78 what better 
way to honor her than to propose a reinterpretation of a rule 
that restores discretion to judges to preserve fairness for 
criminal defendants? 
  
 78 2 WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 43, § 403.02[01][a], at 403-6 
(“The one instance in which Rule 403 does not apply is in ruling on the admissibility of 
convictions pursuant to Rule 609(a)(2).”). 
